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Fantasies of medical reality: an observational study of simulation-based medical 
education 
 
Medicine is increasingly taught in immersive simulated environments, to supplement the 
apprenticeship model of work-based learning. Clinical research on this educational 
practice focuses on its realism, defined as a property of simulation technology. We treat 
realism as a function of subjective but collectively organised perception and imbued with 
fantasy, which we define by drawing on Lacanian studies of virtual reality and workplace 
organisation.  Data from an observational study of four simulation centres in London 
teaching hospitals is drawn on to present an account of what was taught and learned 
about medicine, including medical failure, when medical practice was simulated.  
 
Keywords: Simulation, fantasy, technology, virtual reality, work, medical education 
 
 
  
 3 
This paper is about a relatively new practice in medical education called ‘high-fidelity’ or 
‘immersive’ simulation, and how it looks when it is seen through the concept of fantasy. 
Our interest in seeing it through this lens derives from the term ‘fidelity’, which describes 
simulation on the basis of its faithfulness to reality (Issenberg et al, 2005). The term 
opens a gap between an original and its forgery, which is usually explained 
technologically (CMO, 2008; Gaba, 2004), and thus as known and measurable, in that it 
is the difference between two stable entities. The term fidelity thus marks a difference 
between simulation and reality, foreclosing the possibility of seeing simulation as real: 
part of reality and also creating it, by signifying clinical events. Yet simulating an object 
– such as the gastro-intestinal system - or a situation – such as a woman in hospital 
because her mother is dying – involves making sense of it; understanding, explaining and 
feeling it, and such that one can intervene on the basis of such sensibilities and narratives 
(Johnson and Berner, 2012; McNaughton, 2012; Taylor, 2011; Johnson, 2008; Waldby, 
1997). A simulation of a medical phenomenon thus stages how it assumes form and 
meaning, experientially; how it appears realistic. In that the term fantasy accounts for 
how the world comes to be treated as realistic - meaningful, credible, an experience one 
can have faith in and be loyal to -, its recruitment to explore simulation-based medical 
education serves to highlight how this pedagogic practice is implicated in generating 
attachments to and identifications with ways of seeing, feeling and understanding medical 
work and phenomena.  
 
Let us first describe what we mean by high-fidelity simulation and why we are concerned 
with it. Over the last ten years, many teaching hospitals internationally have had 
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education facilities built which feature elements constituting operating theatres and 
hospital wards, such as beds, drug cabinets, and gas outlets. These facilities also include 
manikins that produce physiological responses such as a palpable pulse rate, breathing 
sounds, and monitor readouts.  
 
 
[insert figure 1 – Simulation suite, showing simulated ward and one way mirror]  
[insert figure 2 – ‘High-fidelity’ manikin for anesthetic training] 
[insert figure 3 – ‘High-fidelity’ manikin for communication skills training] 
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Although simulation has always featured in medical education – for example, chicken 
meat has long been used to simulate human flesh in teaching suturing, or actors used to 
simulate distressed patients in teaching how to break bad news – these new ‘high-fidelity’ 
facilities respond to more recent concerns about the quality and range of work-based 
learning (CMO, 2008). They are intended to act a proxy for, or supplement to, the 
traditional medical apprenticeship, by making it possible to simulate not only isolated 
tasks but also the complexity of the clinical setting, “including its social and emotional 
dimensions” (Curran, 2010).  
 
The ethics of ‘high-fidelity’ simulation are usually articulated in the language of patient 
safety: “mistakes made during simulated exercises do not cause harm to living patients 
and can be more easily exposed and discussed. Mishaps in the course of learning can thus 
be reviewed openly without concern of liability, blame, or guilt—even decisions and 
actions that result in the death of the simulated patient. SBME [simulation-based medical 
education] can help break the culture of silence and denial in medicine regarding 
untoward outcomes and mistakes and their implications about the learner’s competence” 
(Ziv et al, 2003 p.785). The quote illustrates how simulation is treated as ethical insofar 
as it enables inexperienced doctors to gain experience without harming patients, and that 
it does this without the negative emotions associated with learning through trial and error. 
 
The term fantasy gives shape to the trouble we have with this argument. It should be 
emphasized that we are not, consequently, against simulation. Rather, our experience of 
simulation-based teaching, as well as the observational study which is the main focus in 
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this article, lead us to question the ethics of treating patients as in need of protection from 
incompetent doctors, and doctors from the negative emotions consequent upon learning 
medicine. Such claims distribute risk, danger and safety to distinct places in a vision of 
what doing and learning medicine involves, making some aspects invisible, abject, 
outside the frame of signification (Rancière, 2004). Treating simulation as affecting and 
affective in this way allows us to see how the practice is itself ‘emotional’ or invested 
with attachments and identifications, including the (partial) position from which a 
medical scene is modeled. Such a perception has political and methodological 
implications, troubling the treatment of reality as given; indeed, the term fidelity makes 
reality subject to agreement, with disagreement a consequence either of misunderstanding 
or incomprehension (Rancière, 2004a). Differences in visions of reality are then cast as 
temporary delays until consensus is re-established, for instance, by better medical 
evidence, technology or practice. Pedagogically, simulation is then also treated as an 
anteroom prior to entry into a consensual community of experts and an innocent order of 
reality (Pelletier, 2012). Highlighting the fantasmatic aspects of simulation opens up 
possibilities for making the order of medical reality appear multiple, rather than ranging 
from inferior to superior, or low to high in fidelity. It also makes medical reality appear 
alterable, open to re-organization, rather than apparently imposed by the facts of a 
situation (Pelletier, 2009; Rancière, 1987).  
 
To summarise our aim in this article then: we are looking to close the gap between the 
authentic original and the inauthentic forgery, and open one instead between the real and 
its sensibility, such that disagreements about whether a simulation is realistic or not can 
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be heard not simply as differences in levels of knowledge but rather as fantasmatic 
attachments to different versions of medicine. This seems important in exploring how 
simulation can be implicated in more democratic healthcare, including in sensibilities of 
what constitutes failure (Paget 2004).  
 
What is fantasy and how do we know?  
 
Our ideas about fantasy are informed by Lacanian approaches, in which fantasy is 
constitutive of knowledge, rather than its opposite; and in which it is accounted for by 
looking at practices of signification, rather than, for instance, biological instinct. This 
makes fantasy a socio-cultural phenomenon; that which lends the real an imaginary 
appearance of meaning by signifying it in distinct ways.  
 
In Lacanian accounts, the reason for fantasy is to give desire a goal; to answer the 
question of what I desire, and what others desire of me (Nusselder, 2009; Zizek, 1989): 
“[fantasy] provides a schema according to which certain positive objects in reality can 
function as objects of desire” (Zizek, 1997 p.7). In discussing how reality assumes its 
appearance, Lacan (2007 p.47) evokes the selectivity of both fantasy and perception, 
phenomena which are intertwined in his writings: “something sifts, sieves, in such a way 
that reality is only perceived by man, in his natural, spontaneous state at least, as radically 
selected. Man deals with selected bits of reality”. Selection is realized to make desire 
sustainable - in the sense of both bearable and renewable – and by implication to make 
the desiring/desired subject also intelligible, sensible.  
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This brief attempt to pin down the notion of fantasy does not do justice to the complex, 
multiple ways in which the concept is articulated in Lacan’s work and Lacanian writing, 
and gallops roughshod over important distinctions in Lacanian approaches which are 
undone in selective quotes, such as between the real and reality. This is (partly) 
intentional, or performative, to bring out the relationship between fantasy, language, 
identification, desire, and subjectivity, including in the work of distilling a Lacanian 
formula for fantasy so as to make sense of various experiences, and be made sense of as 
(likeable, intelligible – by the right people) researchers. Our argument is intended here to 
make apparent that fantasy is not ‘out there’ in other people’s minds, but intrinsic to 
collective sense-making, including research, which also gives desire a goal, such as 
‘more democratic healthcare’ (Lapping, 2013). 
 
In exploring how the practice of simulation can be researched in its fantasmatic 
dimension, we have drawn on two main bodies of research.  
 
Critical business studies 
The first is critical business and organization studies, in which a Lacanian conception of 
fantasy is deployed to describe how employees assume the desires and agendas 
articulated by the organization as their own, and in so doing, become recognizable to 
themselves and to others as (good, useful, high-performing, flexible, etc.) employees 
(Cederstrom and Hoedemakers, 2010; Glynos, 2011, 2010, 2008; Hoedemakers, 2009; 
Stavrakakis, 2010, 2008). Fantasy here is aligned with ideology, a phenomenon 
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employees invest in to secure a position for themselves within a meaningful scene: “the 
logic of fantasy, then, can be construed as a narrative affirmed by workers, often 
unconsciously, preventing the contestation of suspect social norms, and making less 
visible possible counter-logics” (Glynos, 2010 p.31). This logic has a structure: “The 
logic of fantasy names a narrative structure involving some reference to an idealised 
scenario promising an imaginary fullness or wholeness (the beatific side of fantasy) and, 
by implication, a disaster scenario (the horrific side of fantasy). This narrative structure 
will have a range of features which will vary from context to context, of course, but one 
crucial element is the obstacle preventing the realization of one’s fantasmatic desire” 
(Glynos, 2010 p.29).  
 
Such narratives are the subject of several research studies of fantasy in the workplace 
(Costas and Taheri, 2012; Hoedemakers 2007, 2009), which generate their accounts by 
describing the following: (1) the presentation of an ideal situation (e.g safe healthcare); 
(2) the obstacle to the realization of that ideal (e.g. human error); and (3) a transgression 
of that ideal (e.g. unsafe healthcare). These three elements make sense of a situation, 
imposing a logic on it through a series of equivalences and differences. In our instance of 
simulation-based medical education: unsafe healthcare is bad healthcare; good healthcare 
is safe healthcare; the obstacle to good healthcare is human error. 
 
In the critical business literature, fantasy is analysed to generate a critique of dominant 
norms which are ‘suspect’ insofar as they deny uncertainty and ambiguity and thereby 
lock subjects into repetitive cycles of failure and painful affects, notably guilt (Costas and 
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Taheri, 2012). To develop our example: the equivalence of good healthcare with safe 
healthcare makes invisible practitioners’ work of judging between risks. Making denied 
aspects of work visible again is intended to enable employees gain some distance from 
fantasy narratives, and ‘read for difference’ (Glynos, 2010); in other words, generate 
appearances which account for work differently, often by showing the inter-dependence 
of opposites (e.g. the ideal of safe healthcare as dependent for its perpetuation on its real 
transgression, notably in the figure of the incompetent doctor). The notion of ‘traversing 
the fantasy’ accounts for what happens as a consequence of maintaining a critical 
distance, identifying a re-organization of the economy of affects and signifers in the 
workplace, such that, for instance, good healthcare is no longer treated as logically 
equivalent to safe healthcare, with consequent effects on the distribution of guilt and 
enjoyment in medical work. 
 
‘Simulation studies’ 
The second area of literature informing our analysis is less unified, studying simulations 
from different disciplinary perspectives, including film, internet and technology studies 
(McGowan, 2013; Dean, 2010; Nusselder, 2013, 2009; Zizek 2004, 1999, 1997; Turkle 
1995). Whereas the critical business studies literature focuses on the subjugation of 
employees, film and internet studies place greater emphasis on consumers’ enjoyment 
and pleasure: “the fantasies accompanying computer technologies boil down to the notion 
that they offer us means to surpass the limits that reality imposes upon us. The standard 
fantasy about the new worlds opened up by computer technologies considers them as new 
spaces where all the old limits might be transcended” (Nusselder, 2009 p.11). Here, 
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simulations appear as structured to offer relief from the burdens of reality: what we don’t 
have in reality, we have as a simulation. Consequently, simulations also identify what a 
burden is, and what is lost or lacking in reality. To develop our example: ‘high-fidelity’ 
simulation is described as a way of surpassing the limitations imposed by the burden of 
reduced training hours (CMO, 2008), a claim which makes the failures and risks 
presented by medical work appear as temporal phenomena: a lack of time, and thus a loss 
of experience. Simulation-based medical education then restores what is felt as having 
been lost. 
 
As in the critical business studies literature, fantasy is treated as a defense mechanism, 
which protects against the anxiety of uncertainty and ambiguity by staging a scene in 
which wishes are realized. The question however is (Zizek 1989): whose wishes are they? 
This is answered in reference to the concept of the Other or the Other’s gaze, which 
describes the perspective from which a scene is staged, such that the riddle of desire 
(what do I want? what do others want from me?) is answered. The idea of the Other’s 
gaze has been particularly influential in film studies, in exploring the perspective from 
which characters have to be seen to appear heroic, attractive, horrifying, feminine or 
masculine, as ‘real’ men or women, and so on. The Other’s gaze is, in this respect, the 
camera’s viewpoint, from which a scene is perceived to make sense, but within which it 
is not visible. 
 
To take an example close to this paper’s subject: in her studies of the Visible Human 
Project (VHP), Waldby (2000, 1997) explores what makes this ‘high fidelity’ anatomical 
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simulation so compelling in medical literature, arguing that its appeal lies in how it shows 
the body not simply as it is but as it ought to be to a medical gaze: “If the body’s life can 
be described as animated matter, the technology of the VHP can effectively claim to have 
cancelled out the effects of death by translating the corpse into the simulational space of 
the virtual screen, with all its powers of complex animation. The VHP partakes of the 
general repression of death in medical knowledge of life, providing a complex model for 
the living body which is precisely a reanimated corpse” (1997). The VHP is seen as a 
pedagogic breakthrough because it shows the body to be manipulable and controllable by 
medical intervention; as individual and standardised, indistinguishably; and as eternal as 
software data, and thus no longer the bearer of mortality’s burden (by contrast, for 
instance, to corpses that decay). The ability of the VHP to act as surrogate for the fleshy 
body is dependent on identifying with this gaze, and the desires it animates.  
 
In this vein of literature, the purpose of analyzing fantasy is to make reality visible as an 
appearance, rather than an essence; an image or scene which is connected to the 
experience of pleasure and enjoyment. Simulations are treated not simply as reflections 
of such affective economies, but also as forms of instruction, teaching how and what to 
desire. For example, the VHP teaches the features of a desirable body in medicine, 
notably the qualities of being eternally repairable and not decaying uncontrollably. 
Analyses of fantasy enable discussion of the terms upon which a representation is seen 
and taught to be realistic. The notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’ arises also, and points to 
the possibility of reconfiguring images to make denied aspects visible, better to respond 
to them - ‘better’ here a matter of politics and ethics.  
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Studying fantasy in high-fidelity medical simulation 
 
These two domains of literature provide conceptual resources with which to analyse the 
use of simulation for professional education. They point to the way in which fantasy can 
be accounted for in terms of a narrative structure featuring an ideal, its obstacle, and its 
transgression; as well as a gaze that discriminates between these, in the form of burdens 
in reality and that which relieves them. The image of the subject is somewhat different in 
each domain, appearing either as the exploited worker of a capitalist labour market or as 
an enjoying consumer of limitless capacities. We draw on both domains in part because 
they offer different kinds of empirical instantiations of the concept of fantasy, with the 
simulations studies literature exploring medicine specifically, but also because the subject 
of simulation-based medical education appears to us as neither an exploited worker nor 
an entertained consumer, but something of both.  
 
Let us now move onto how we arrived at this perception. Between January and October 
2012, we observed 30 training courses in the simulation centres of four London teaching 
hospitals, with a view to describing how teaching and learning happened in practice. The 
clinicians attending such courses were usually postgraduate, ‘trainee’ doctors, sometimes 
also nurses and other health professionals. Each course involved 4-12 trainees, and 4-6 
tutors, who were usually senior doctors and nurses. Courses usually lasted one day, and 
were composed of three elements. First, an introductory lecture describing the purpose of 
the course. Second, a sequence of scenarios (between 2 and 6), lasting approximately 15 
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minutes, and in which 1-2 trainees ‘played out’ a situation specified by tutors, in a 
simulated ward which had one-way mirrors and video cameras, so that the other course 
participants could watch the action. Third, and following each scenario, a ‘de-briefing’, 
lasting between 20 and 45 minutes, and in which trainees and tutors discussed what 
happened. We also interviewed eight trainees, six months after their participation in a 
course, about the pleasures and frustrations of their work, and whether the course had re-
organised these. For this article, we are therefore drawing on field notes, interview 
transcripts, and the video recordings generated during a course. Ethical approval for the 
research was granted by Imperial College, London, and funding was provided by the 
London Deanery.  
 
We have organised our analysis into three parts, identifying patterns across the three 
elements described above: introductory lectures, scenarios and de-briefing discussions. 
We will account for each in turn, in the light of the concepts and approaches we have 
described from the literature on fantasy.  
 
Introductory lectures: simulation as therapy for medical error  
 
All but one of the courses we observed presented high-fidelity simulation as an occasion 
on which to learn about a model of medical error called human factors, imported from 
other ‘high-risk industries’, notably aviation. This model was said to explain error in two 
main ways. First, error was a function of faulty systems rather than individuals; second, 
error was inevitable because humans were fallible. This explanation meant that error 
 15 
could be learned from, rather than punished; and could be mitigated by gaining 
knowledge of ‘non-technical skills’. The following excerpts illustrate how this model was 
presented:  
 
Human error is responsible for 70 to 80 % [of errors]. So it's not machines going wrong, 
the drugs are wrong, it's all human error. So 70 to 80%. It's something we need to keep 
in the back of our minds. We are humans, and we do make mistakes. But it's how we 
can recognise the risks in the situation that we are in. So we mentioned non-technical 
skills at the beginning, that we need to deal with a crisis, and the sorts of things that we 
are going to be looking at in each of the scenarios, although they are all different, is 
how you cooperate, how you lead, are you aware of the situation that you are in and 
managing that situation, and how you make decisions. So it's mainly non-technical 
skills. You'll all be very good at managing a patient who is sick, it's not what we are 
looking at, although it is part of it. We want to get you thinking about non-technical 
skills.  
(Video transcript, centre 1) 
 
According to this logic, clinical work divides into two domains: the technical/clinical and 
the non-technical/the interactional. Error is introduced into the clinical domain by means 
of its instantiation as interactional activity. The catholic resonance of this model of failure 
is brought out by the title of the medical report that was referenced in introductory 
lectures: To Err is Human (Institute of Medicine, 1999). Non-technical skills are that 
which turn inherent human fallibility into a virtue, overcoming the deadlock consequent 
upon figuring clinical knowledge as failing because of those who enact it. If we look at 
this model of error in terms of its narrative structure, the ideal is that of a healthy and 
health-giving system in which the distribution of skills to healthcare workers manages 
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risk. The obstacle to this ideal is human fallibility itself: an intractable element identified 
on the basis of an ethos of resistance to something internal, irredeemable. It is this human 
factor which leads healthcare astray, causing it to kill rather than cure.  
 
Within this account, simulation is safe because error can be detached from its 
consequences: 
 
So I often say, when we're running full immersion simulation, particularly with the 
more junior doctors is that ‘make as many mistakes as you want because everyone can 
learn from it and you can’t kill the mannequin’. Yeah? You can make it arrest but you 
can't kill it whereas if it’s a real patient then you can.  
(video transcript, centre 2). 
 
The invitation to ‘make mistakes’ presents high-fidelity simulation as a transgression: 
because death is expunged, the prohibition on killing patients is removed. Trainees 
should make mistakes precisely to learn from them, an injunction which presents 
simulation as a place in which taboos are to be broken. This argument aligns with 
numerous accounts of ‘virtual reality’ as a site of perversion in which norms are 
transgressed (Turkle, 1995), but with the effect of their fiercer enforcement in the ‘real 
world’, by virtue of the categorical difference inscribed between the virtual and the real 
(McGowan, 2013). 
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The ethics of this model of error and of simulation are brought into relief by comparing 
them to earlier accounts of failure in medicine, and by examining the viewpoint from 
which simulation is consequently perceived to be safe.    
 
In their classic studies of medical error, Bosk (1979/2003) and Paget (1983/2004) depict 
error as intrinsic to medicine. Bosk’s study describes the classifications used by surgeons 
to identify different types of error, with some treated as constitutive of learning and doing 
surgery. Paget’s treatise shows error to be endemic to medicine, inherent to the 
experimental effort involved in diagnosis and therapy. In each case, the obstacle to 
healthcare’s efforts to heal are constitutive of its object of knowledge: “medical work 
does not shape events, but risks a shape for events that are already going wrong” (Paget, 
2004 p.128). Accounting for error in terms of human factors shifts the obstacle to the 
subject who practices medicine; error/failure moves from the deed to the doer. Lack also 
shifts from medicine as an unpredictable, uncertain practice, to the medical worker who 
lacks non-technical skills. Simulation then appears safe because such skills can be 
acquired with certainty – as guaranteed by the safety record of the aviation industry 
which uses simulation extensively.   
 
Bosk’s and Paget’s accounts emerge from an identification with professions of medicine: 
they endeavour to see error as it appears to clinicians in their work, and specifically, in 
their efforts to address risk in patients’ bodies. A scene in which error is staged as tragic 
exception caused by human fallibility implies identification with another gaze, one which 
treats medical knowledge as perfectible: error-free when applied correctly. By extension, 
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such knowledge manufactures, and also therefore, manages the risks implied by its 
practice. Paget argues that patients are prone to adopting such a gaze, to deny the burden 
of anxiety and uncertainty imposed by illness. Dejours’ (2008) account of human factors 
presents it rather as a managerial gaze, in which failure is a problem overcome through 
employee training. Both of these arguments suggest that human factors teaching can be 
construed as an invitation to identify with a gaze external to professions of medicine: one 
which sees such professions as powerful and privileged by dint of the perfection of their 
scientific knowledge and burdened only by generic fallibility.  
 
Introductory lectures however positioned tutors and trainees differently with respect to 
how failure could be perceived. Tutors emphasised the democratic consequences of a 
human factors model, which universalised the propensity to error and suspended the logic 
by which error equated with inexperience. Trainees however did not take up the 
invitation to ‘make mistakes’ enthusiastically: they demonstrated palpable anxiety at the 
start of courses and often throughout. This anxiety was explained in coffee breaks in 
terms of failing in the eyes of peers and seniors. This is suggestive of the different ways 
in which simulation appeared realistic and safe for tutors and trainees. Courses were set 
up for the benefit of trainees, which excluded the possibility of error being seen in the 
actions of tutors. Trainees, by contrast, were due to be watched by fellow professionals in 
order to make their failures perceptible. Error thus appeared on the basis of a lack of 
credentialised knowledge and experience. The model of ‘democratic’ fallibility was thus 
realised in a course structure in which errors could only be seen in the actions of junior 
individuals – a pattern which repeats the organisation of medical apprenticeship.  
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Scenarios: plotting narratives about what clinical work consists of 
 
Scenarios were referred to in terms of the clinical condition they manifested, such as 
cardiac arrest, anaphylaxis, or ectopic pregnancy. Dramatised conditions were usually 
life-threatening. A scenario began with tutors telling trainees a brief narrative giving the 
patient/mannequin a back-story, such as: ‘Mrs Smith has been admitted to A&E with 
stomach pain, and you are the first doctor to examine her’.  The condition to be simulated 
was not revealed. The trainees acting in the scenario then entered the simulation room, 
and examined the mannequin, as well as other information set up by tutors, such as 
medical notes. A patient’s condition invariably deteriorated rapidly, so that the trainee 
had to call in others to help. All of the scenarios we observed concluded with a resolution 
of the emergency: the patient’s life saved, the condition stabilised. 
 
This narrative organisation meant that presenting problems always had clinical solutions: 
the obstacle to be overcome was of a clinical nature, calling on the display of specialist 
clinical knowledge, and leading to clinical outcomes. Such outcomes, such as a stabilised 
blood pressure, appeared as the consequence of trainees’ actions, such as giving fluids. 
Trainees thereby appeared as heroes in a story that told of the power of clinical 
intervention: an initial state of relative equilibrium is disrupted by an event (e.g. 
collapsing blood pressure), the trainee takes action and, by this action, brings the chaos to 
an end (Todorov, 1977). The hero was played by whichever profession was being trained: 
courses for anaesthetists idealised anaesthetic intervention; courses for surgeons idealised 
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surgical intervention; courses aimed at junior medical trainees demonstrated the power of 
their professional capacity to save patients, and featured seniors and nurses as secondary 
characters within the drama. One course only departed from this trope: aimed at nurses, 
participants were called on to respond to multiple, relatively stable patients (rather than a 
single critically ill one) and ongoing obstacles that were not resolved. By virtue of this 
narrative structure, the role of the herculean hero was replaced by that of the sisyphean 
worker, a difference which perhaps throws some light on the different organisation of 
desire in medicine and nursing.   
 
Although scenarios were differentiated by the clinical classification of the obstacle, the 
element common to all of them was the threat of death. Always present in the wings, 
death however never entered the stage, a narrative convention which tutors described as 
‘the manikin never dies’. The removal of death’s burden echoes Waldby’s (1997) claim 
that in marking medicine’s point of failure, death is repressed from medical simulation. 
However, whereas in Waldy’s anatomical simulators death was not represented, it 
appeared in our study as foreclosed transgression: always there, and always pre-empted. 
The nightmare of killing patients was repeatedly envisaged and repeatedly dissipated.  
 
Ahmed’s (2009) articulation of happiness and its role in ‘suturing’ a collective is perhaps 
helpful here: she refers to happiness as an ideal which establishes consensus on what a 
‘we’ should strive for, illustrating this through the image of the happy family. By 
representing an object cause of happiness, the image of the happy family enforces 
heterosexual norms, by making non-heterosexual bonds appear necessarily unhappy. In 
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representing patient survival as the collective object of clinical desire, and such survival 
as a function of ‘teamwork’, the solidarity of work appeared structurally, narratively, in 
opposition to the death of patients: patients survived because clinical teams happily 
bonded.  
 
In presenting patient survival, professional belonging and clinical capacity as equivalent, 
the narrative conventions of scenarios reflected trainees’ accounts, generated during 
interviews, of what made clinical work enjoyable: 
 
You may sort of feel embarrassed to say it, but I do quite like the adrenalin when 
you’ve got somebody, and it’s three in the morning, and they’re about to die and you’re 
trying to stop them about to die, I quite like that. 
(Angela, medical trainee) 
 
However, the desirability and excitement of near patient death contrasts with how 
trainees portrayed their usual work routines:  
 
I remember the initial disappointment of becoming a doctor, and it’s your first year as a 
doctor, and you think you’re going to be seeing patients and actually a lot of what you 
do is being delegated these menial administrative tasks. 
(Tracy, medical trainee) 
 
The imagery of clinical power overcoming obstacles also contrasts with how trainees 
represented the frustrations of their work:  
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All specialities come with some conditions which slightly fill you with a sense of 
futility, that you’re not really doing anything. So […] people with alcoholic liver 
disease. You work really hard and you do all the exciting stuff to get them better but 
they’ll keep drinking and they’ll come back again. 
(Peter, medical trainee) 
 
These accounts of the pleasures and frustrations of clinical work are suggestive of the 
enjoyment offered by simulation scenarios: they dramatised narratives of clinical (and 
trainee) capacity to shape events, making imperceptible menial administration and futile 
expert action. These consequently appeared as external to ‘real’ clinical work. 
 
We discussed above the argument in the ‘simulation studies’ literature that the pleasure 
they afford and the realism they are attributed stems from the way they remove burdens 
which limit the scope for self-realising action in ‘reality’ (Nusselder, 2009; Zizek, 2013). 
The narrative structure of scenarios, including the choice of obstacle confronting the hero 
(which for instance does not require him/her to address intractable welfare needs or 
operate marginally in bureaucratic organisations) shows both how they appeared realistic 
(showing real clinical action, in a way parallel to how films generate pleasure by showing 
real men or real romance); as well as how they functioned pedagogically, teaching not 
merely skills, but their meaning within a vision of what clinical work should, ideally, 
consist of.  
 
De-briefing: making error and failure explicable 
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Scenarios were followed by group discussions arranged in a large circle. Tutors started by 
asking the group to describe what happened, often requesting that those who had 
participated in a scenario withhold their input initially. This was intended to collectivise 
the experience, and also acknowledged that such participants were often lost for words. 
In describing ‘what happened’, trainees and tutors constructed a narrative organised by 
causes and reasons, decisions and strategies, and historicised through the use of the past 
tense, which made events perceptible through a lens of hindsight, in relation to what they 
eventually led to.  
 
Accounting for what happened however positioned trainees and tutors differently.  
Trainees who had participated in a scenario often referred to what they should have done, 
what they had not seen or known, what they had not done well: the scenario, in its 
retrospective signification, was narrativised in the tragic genre of a tale of regret and 
missed opportunities. By contrast, tutors’ interventions – notably, the frequently asked 
‘so, what could you have done differently?’ - portrayed the scenario as one possible 
performance among multiple others, imbued with what Murray (1997) describes as the 
‘malleability’ of the comedy genre, in which mistakes are retrievable and stories can be 
started over and reach a different resolution – foreclosing, for instance, the finality of 
death.  
 
The difference in genre points to a difference in gaze. In manifesting guilt in the wake of 
failure, trainees identified with a gaze that knows and passes judgement on correct and 
incorrect action, innocent and culpable people. This is suggestive of a desire to know, 
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with certainty and without ambiguity, one’s capacities as a clinician; knowing, for sure, 
whether one’s actions are correct or erroneous. In describing non-technical skills as 
indeterminate, tutors identified with (and explicitly named) a ‘non-judgemental’ gaze 
from whose comic perspective failure was an occasion for bonding. One might argue then 
that trainees’ confessions did not address an actual gaze – that of tutors – but an imagined 
one, with much greater authority. This account was offered to us by several tutors who 
characterised trainee interventions in de-briefings as repeated requests for reassurance. 
 
Such an account neglects two phenomena. The first is the explanation for failure given by 
tutors to trainees, which established a de facto guilt by virtue of the human factor. The 
second is the repeated offer of reassurance given by tutors to trainees on the quality of 
their performance. Although simulation courses were described as occasions for ‘non-
judgemental’ teaching interventions, the usual pattern of exchanges consisted of: tutor 
initiation of the discussion; trainee response; tutor’s positive judgement. As an example: 
 
Tutor 1 So describe what happened? […] 
Trainee I think the things I know, I notice this in myself in my 
 clinical practice is my...I come up with a clear plan 
 and can’t communicate it without/I sort of chop and  
 change a lot 
Tutor 1 You were very clear. First you wanted [this 
Trainee Yes], and then I wanted that 
Tutor 1 And then you changed your tack […] 
Trainee And then quite early on I had to have a quite grumpy 
 conversation with someone on the phone. I was 
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 probably a bit rude, and I do apologise for that […] 
Tutor 2 And you were very succinct in stating he’s sick, 
 we haven’t done anything, we are resuscitating,  
 and he’s not going to go anywhere, so I think that 
 was really good 
Tutor 1 I think you were really clear, I think you were assertive  
  […] 
Tutor 2 I thought you did that very well, because you were 
 assertive 
Tutor 1 You were very assertive, I thought it was very good 
Tutor 2 And the whole point of your focus was your patient 
 That was very apparent. And that you really didn’t 
 have time to talk. And you can have all of this 
 administrative conversation in the background later on. 
 That was done very effectively 
 (video transcript, centre 2) 
 
The extract illustrates a discursive pattern of re-signifying confessed failures: so, 
‘chopping and changing’ is re-signified ‘changing tack’, ‘rude’ is re-signified ‘assertive’. 
The pattern illustrates how human factors were taught: namely, by initiating an account 
of a guilty self, and then re-signifying it to make it show non-technical capability. The 
substantive content of ‘non-technical skills’ was thus the negation of guilt. Tutors’ 
comedic interventions might also be understood in terms of such a negation. Negation 
however implies recognition of a positive form (Kress and Hodge, 1979): trainees’ 
anxiety was consequent, we would argue, upon this recognition.  
 
 26 
Fantasising collective action to rescue patients 
To explore the ethical implications of this negation, we would like to compare the 
discursive pattern above to an exception within our fieldwork. It occurred during a course 
organised to remedy the high number of ‘failure to rescue’1 incident reports generated by 
one ward. All ward staff had been invited to attend, although on the day of our visit, 
participants consisted exclusively of nurses. During the introductory lecture, a tutor (a 
doctor) said that the course was not about punishing poor performance but learning to 
respond better to an emergency. Several participants responded sceptically: 
 
So what are you going to do if you come round to my ward and I have seven patients to 
look after, two post-ops, and no HCA2. What are you going to say or do?  
(Field notes, centre 4)  
 
The tutor responded that ‘hospital management’, in the form of the deputy director of 
nursing, had also been invited, so that she could learn about the problems staff were 
experiencing, and support them in overcoming these. Several participants responded that 
‘their’ problems were caused by management’s cost-cutting exercises.  
 
The first of several scenarios then took place. These were however perceived differently 
than on other courses: they simulated something different. The following extract from a 
group discussion illustrates this: 
 
Tutor 1 The problem is, Sally, you didn’t tell your team-mates  
 you had the sickest patient. I was just interested in  
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 knowing - it’s not a criticism - why you felt you had to  
 cope on your own? 
Nurse 1  That’s what I do on the ward 
Tutor 1 You might be stuck in a ward when you are trying to  
 cope and you don’t go and get help? 
Nurse 1 I’m just re-living yesterday, it’s constantly juggling. I  
 find it heavy-going, but I don’t want to seem I’m not 
 coping with it 
Nurse 2 We need to re-design the system so that nurse leaders  
 don’t get attached to particular beds and oversee the  
 whole ward [there follows an extended discussion  
 about whether this system is in fact already in place but  
 undermined by staff shortages] 
Tutor 1 You need to think as a group how you want to deal with  
 these situations. You need to have agreement on this, as  
 a unit 
 (Field notes, centre 4) 
 
Sally’s failure/error here appears as common practice on the ward. Nurse 2’s intervention, 
for instance, treats Sally’s failure to call for help as indicative of the division of labour on 
the ward, a move corroborated by Tutor 1’s final contribution. What the scenario shows, 
therefore, is how work is done, including the feelings associated with this (‘juggling, 
heavy going’). What it does not appear to show, as on other courses, is Sally’s 
(inadequate) clinical capability or inherent human fallibility.  
 
In this and other group discussions on the day, scenarios were treated by participants as 
ways of showing management, as well as each other (note above the ‘I don’t want to 
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seem I’m not coping with it’), the realities of work, in contrast to its prescribed 
representation; for instance, subsequent to the extract quoted above, there was extended 
discussion about the impossibility of completing the 27-point admissions checklist within 
allocated time. This made Sally’s failure illustrative of an antagonism between resources 
and prescribed work tasks, and signified the checklist as the expression, but not the 
realisation, of the ideal to make patients safe. The obstacle to such an ideal shifted from 
human fallibility to the multiple and conflicting desires within healthcare. The 
transgression of that ideal appeared as unrealised protocols consequent upon conflicting 
priorities, rather than employee ignorance or incapability.   
 
This transformation in what could be seen in a scenario – the basis on which it appeared 
realistic - illustrates aspects of the Lacanian notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’. The 
introductory lecture and subsequent group discussions staged a conflict between two 
narratives for failed rescue: ‘management only care about cutting costs’ versus ‘nurses 
lack non-technical skills’. The re-enactment of clinical work made visible the gap 
between each explanation for failure and inarticulated work/management practices: it 
made visible what each explanation endeavoured to hide, such that the hospital’s budget 
had been cut and that staff numbers had been reduced. Real antagonisms within 
healthcare provision became speakable, making it necessary for nurses and tutors to 
loosen attachments to fantasised narratives about failure.  
 
The notion of traversing the fantasy implies constructing alternative/better fantasies, 
rather than abandoning fantasy altogether (Zizek, 2013). So what were the two fantasised 
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narratives for failure replaced with? Amid discussions about whose performance was to 
blame, tutors’ interventions evoked the possibility of finding better ways of managing 
antagonisms between work tasks. In the extract above, for instance, the tutors do not offer 
absolution, but rather ask the group to find, collectively, responses to the realities that the 
scenario showed. This request was resisted several times with counter-claims that 
management had this responsibility, but statements were also made describing intentions 
to review the division of labour with respect to specific tasks; the ability and right to do 
this was thereby also claimed (Rancière, 2004). The fraughtness of such discussions 
demonstrates the work (in the psychoanalytic as well as the everyday sense) involved in 
constructing the fantasy of collective, cooperative, team working (Dejours, 2009). 
Although agreement was not reached on the day of our visit, there was promise in 
fantasising the division of labour as a collective achievement, not only because it offered 
a practical example of ‘more democratic healthcare’, but also because it grappled with the 
problem of failed rescue more substantively than fantasies of human fallibility and 
negated guilt.  
 
Conclusion: re-thinking the relationship between simulation, fidelity and learning  
 
In this paper, we have endeavoured to show that high-fidelity simulation does not simply 
denote clinical practice but mythologises it (Barthes, 1957, 1961): it is not so much 
analogous to reality, mechanically reproducing it, but rather constitutes a commentary on 
clinical practice, teaching values, reasons and desires about how such practice ought to be 
seen and felt. It is insofar as participants identify with such a perception that simulation 
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appears faithful to reality. This argument has implications for considering the ethics of 
simulation, raising questions about how it is implicated in teaching professional ideals 
and identifying the obstacles to their realisation, as well as the burdens of clinical work.   
 
Treating simulation as a mythology might be read as a criticism of its educational value: 
a dismissal of its claim to realism and an identification of its deceptive illusions. Such a 
reading treats simulation as a lie, in the Platonic sense of a simulacrum, and/or as an 
occasion for ideological revelation, showing how far the forgery has strayed from its 
authentic original. Both moves assume that reality can be seen and known directly, 
unmediated by fantasy. We have drawn on the Lacanian notion of fantasy to avoid this 
reading of our argument, and to treat fantasy as that which enables reality to make sense 
– something one can be faithful to - rather than which leads away from it.  
 
The concept of fantasy does however denaturalise reality, pointing to how it emerges 
affectively, by excluding, abjecting, and papering over contradictions. In the first part of 
the analysis, we focused on how an account of human factors assigned risk to human 
fallibility and systems design, excluding it thereby from clinical work and patients’ 
bodies. Compared to earlier sociological accounts of medical failure, the human factors 
narrative shifted error’s location from the practice of clinical work to the practice of 
clinical workers. This was justified in terms of patient safety, making error into a 
redeeming occasion for learning rather than the endlessly and unproductively repeating 
nightmare of killing patients.  
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We have argued that this way of making error into a phenomenon one can learn from 
made practitioners guilty by default. By implication, also, it made them not responsible. 
It is in the light of this account of a perfectible science degraded by the fallibility of its 
human yet heroic practitioners that we interpret trainees’ anxiety during simulation 
courses, as well as the guilt articulated in de-briefings, which was invariably 
accompanied by a denial of responsibility: indeed, whenever errors were evoked (almost 
exclusively by trainees on their own performance), there followed shortly after a 
discussion of their causes in the limitations of the technology. This raises a question 
about what was learned from error on simulation courses.  
 
What was stated to be learned was how to avoid or mitigate errors in ‘real’ clinical 
practice. This treats error as a matter of consensus: it is there for all to see and infer the 
lesson from. Our account of the ‘failure to rescue’ course shows rather the identification 
of error, and the account of clinical reality, to be contested social practices – a claim often 
made in literature on error in ‘real’ clinical practice (Waring, 2009). The work and 
frustration we witnessed in explaining ‘failure to rescue’ points to what was avoided on 
most courses, in which emphasis was placed by tutors on identifying and praising ‘non-
technical skills’ and emphasising realism, rather than discussing failure. The ethics of 
simulation have been justified in terms of pre-empting the social antagonism associated 
with medical error and its consequences, and which make error difficult to learn from 
(Ziv et al, 2003); we would however argue that such antagonism was pre-empted not so 
much by the cancellation of error’s effects as by the marginalisation of considerations 
such as whose view of reality and error was represented in a simulation, whose was 
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excluded, and according to which principles and pleasures had clinical practice been 
selectively ‘sieved’ for its simulation. 
 
We started this paper by describing our aim in terms of closing the gap between the 
original and its forgery and encouraging ‘more democratic healthcare’. These aims are 
closely related, in treating reality as contingent appearance rather than given essence: a 
phenomenon subject to disagreement rather than expert consensus. Defending these aims 
does not involve giving up on reality and sinking into relativism and ‘mere’ fantasy, but 
rather putting questions about what constitutes reality at the centre of simulation’s 
pedagogic practice, such that disagreements about what makes clinical practice good, 
better or fail, meaningful or meaningless, are visible and articulable. Our account of the 
‘failure to rescue’ course is suggestive of how this might be achieved, as well as the work 
involved in bringing fantasies to light through the identification of difference within 
reality; within the multiple and conflicting narratives about what is desirable in healthcare. 
It shows what scope there is for simulation to change from serving as an ante room prior 
to entry into a given reality, to an occasion on which to dramatize and ‘work through’ the 
fantasies which make clinical practice meaningful, as well as the obstacles which threaten 
this. In this respect, we would argue for an ethics of simulation based on its instantiation 
of a distinct regime of visibility, in which the meaning and organisation of work is 
subject to collective deliberation, rather than on its promise of protecting patients from 
doctors. This regime can be imagined as allowing fantasies to be adjusted and re-framed, 
to address repeated and painful failure, including the death of patients.  
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Endnotes 
1. failure to rescue’ is a category within the hospital’s taxonomy of errors which refers to 
an event in which healthcare workers failed to respond appropriately to a rapidly 
deteriorating patient, who then died.  
2.  HCA stands for healthcare assistant 
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